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WHAT AND WHY
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WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

by

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CONTENTS

“What’s the News from China?”	1
I. How the Revolution Started.	5
II. What Produced China’s Nationalists?	24
III. The Days of the War Lords.	41
IV. Sun Yat-sen	59
V. What Is the Nationalist Movement?	79
VI. China and Foreign Nations...	99
VII. In a Nutshell.....	118
<i>Together with a Geographical Postscript</i>	
A Mind-Map of China.....	123

MAPS

The Chinese Revolution of 1911	11
Why China Protested Against the Shantung Award.....	25
Foreign Concessions and Spheres in China.....	91
China at the Present Hour..	115

“What’s the News from China?”

The Author’s
FOREWORD

“MY DEAR,” said Mrs. Leander P. Jenkins, looking across the breakfast table at her husband, “what’s the news from China?”

“China!” came the response from behind the outspread stretches of the morning newspaper. “Why do you want to know about China?”

“Because,” explained Mrs. Jenkins with that patience which she had learned to be the principal ingredient of a successful marriage, “because we had the most wonderful speaker at the club yesterday, and he told us that if we are to be citizens of the modern world we must keep informed as to what is going on in China.”

Something that sounded suspiciously like a snort came from behind the newspaper.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

But Mrs. Jenkins was not to be denied. With unconcealed reluctance her husband finally turned his attention from the current murder trial and began to read that day's dispatches from Shanghai.

"Here you are then," he said. "'Reports reaching this city tonight indicate that General Chiang Kai-shek has gained a strategical advantage over General Chang Chung-chang, whose army is deployed somewhere in the vicinity of Changchow. Should General Chang Tso-lin fail to reinforce his ally within the next twenty-four hours there is a strong likelihood that the entire territory between Hangchow and Chinkiang will be swept clear of the Shantung forces.' Say, what does all that mean?"

"I'm sure I don't know, my dear," admitted Mrs. Jenkins. "These Changs and Chengs and Shantungs all sound about alike to me. Oh dear, does it say anything there about Mabel Gordon's wedding?" . . .

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

That, it is to be feared, is a fairly representative experience of Americans in trying to read the news from China. Instinctively we feel that this is news of major importance, but the manner of its presentation makes it almost unintelligible to most of us. China has been identified in our minds with mystery ever since we first peered tremblingly through the steam-fogged windows at Tom Lee working within his laundry. And now, just when we should know China best, we find ourselves so confused by the daily dispatches that we are again almost ready to give up trying to make sense out of this enigma.

There is no reason why any intelligent American should not have a clear idea of the controlling factors in the Chinese situation. The effect of confusion produced by the strange names that appear in the daily press is more apparent than real. While there are all sorts of details in the picture that the specialist in oriental

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

affairs sees, it is quite possible for the casual reader to discover the main elements in the composition, and so to see a picture that is both simple and true. The chapters that follow are an attempt to paint this simple picture. The details are left out. But the necessary lines, in both foreground and background, are here. It is my hope that, having been given this picture, the reader can then fit in with understanding the details as they arrive each day in the daily press.

A geographical postscript—"A Mind-Map of China," begins on page 123. It is there for those who prefer to visualize the geographical China before they fill in the historical picture.

I

HOW THE REVOLUTION STARTED

THE Chinese Fourth of July is called, by them, the Double Ten festival. That is, they regard the tenth day of the tenth month as their day of independence. For it was on October 10, 1911, that a premature mutiny in a garrison at Hanyang,¹ a city at almost the exact geographical center of China, started the revolution which swept the Manchu dynasty from the throne and led to the proclamation of the republic.

The Manchus had ruled China for 267 years. They were foreigners who had

1. Hanyang, pronounced as spelled.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

come down from the north (Manchuria) to conquer the last native Chinese dynasty—the Mings, whose family name is such a boon to curio collectors—twenty years before the English captured a Dutch colony on a little island on the opposite side of the world and gave to it the name New York. A succession of capable emperors had made the Manchu rule a powerful one for a century and a half. Then inner decay set in. Just then, the west knocked at China's door.

ISOLATED CHINA

China had kept herself clear from contact with the western world until about the time when George Washington became the first President of the United States. Traders and Catholic missionaries had, at times, penetrated this reserve. Some of them had even gained a remarkable foothold inside China. But commercial contacts with the west were slight, and political contacts almost non-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

existent. Then came the rise of modern industrialism in the west, with traders ready to take any chances to find new markets. And this western commercial aggressiveness came just at the time when its inner decay was weakening the Manchu dynasty so that it could no longer keep the foreigners out.

The result was a struggle that started soon after the opening of the last century and that ended, after various wars, with the cession of certain outlying territories to foreign nations, with the establishment of "treaty ports" in which foreigners could live and carry on business, with the granting of land at certain of these ports as "concessions" (in effect, small foreign colonies) and finally, with the marking out of huge "spheres of influence" within which these foreign nations were to have paramount commercial rights, and which some of them certainly hoped ultimately to annex. Naturally, this course of events was not popular with the Chinese.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

And naturally, they placed the blame on the decadent Manchu dynasty.

THE TAIPING REBELLION

The tottering dynasty invited rebellion. This came first in 1850. It lasted until 1864. It was called the Taiping² rebellion—a name which had no other significance than that of providing a high-sounding title, since Taiping means ‘the Great Peace.’ The rebellion brought peace to more than twenty million, perhaps more than forty million, Chinese—peace in the form of death. It came within a hair’s breadth of overthrowing the Manchus and setting up a new dynasty. But, after it had obtained control of the lower valley of the Yangtze³ river, the foreigners, with their principal settlement at Shanghai,⁴ at that river’s mouth, made up their minds that the old

2. Taiping, pronounced as spelled.

3. Yangtze, pronounced Yang-tsee.

4. Shanghai, pronounced as spelled.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

weak dynasty would be easier to do business with than a new dynasty, suspected of anti-foreign leanings. So foreign soldiers of fortune were found to lead the armies of the panic-stricken Manchus. Two Americans won fame in this way, one dying in battle and being enrolled in the calendar of Confucian saints, and the other playing the traitor and deserting to the Taipings. Finally, a regular British army officer was loaned to the Manchus. He put a finish to this fourteen-year rebellion. He is known to history as "Chinese" Gordon.

Thus, in 1864, the foreigners had first intervened in China's internal affairs to bolster up an outworn rule that China, left to herself, would have repudiated. The old dynasty, thus resuscitated, managed to hang on for another 47 years. This was mainly because there came into control the dowager empress, Tzu Hsi,⁵ one of the most remarkable women in

5. Tzu Hsi, pronounced Dzoo See.


WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

history. Although under constant pressure, both from within and without, the dowager empress held things together until her death in 1908. Then the dynasty rapidly fell to pieces. Tzu Hsi was affectionately known by her subjects as "the old tiger," which was a fair indication of her methods of administration.

FOREIGN NATIONS BEGIN GRABBING

The one big mistake of the dowager empress came in 1900. By that time, foreign encroachments had driven the Chinese to the point of madness. Great Britain had her series of seaport colonies running all the way along the coast from Hongkong at the extreme south to Weiheiwei⁶ at the extreme north, and her sphere of influence blanketing the Yangtze valley all the way from Shanghai westward to Tibet. France had her French Indo-China and her trade-mark on the great southwestern province of

6. Weiheiwei, pronounced Way-high-way.



The Chinese Revolution of 1911

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Yunnan.⁷ Germany had her Tsing-tao⁸ (fateful name at Paris in 1919!) and her mark on the sacred and teeming province of Shantung.⁹ Japan had her Formosa, and her mark on the province of Fukien.¹⁰ Russia had her mark on Manchuria and Mongolia.

Westerners were writing books on "The Break-up of China," and calmly telling what portions of the prize were to be allotted to each grabber. The empress dowager probably had little hope of successfully resisting the foreigners, but she knew that if she did not try to resist in such a way as to carry conviction, her dynasty's doom was sealed. So, she permitted—or at least did not suppress—the attack on the foreigners of the Society of Righteous Fists, a name which we westerners, who demand words of one syllable,

7. Yunnan, pronounced You-nan.

8. Tsing-tao, pronounced Tsing-dao.

9. Shantung, pronounced Shan-dung.

10. Fukien, pronounced Foo-kee-en.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

have twisted into the uprising of the Boxers.

The Boxer rebellion was a tragic madness. But westerners should keep this in mind: After it had been put down in blood and destruction, there was an end to the foreign partition of China. To that extent, it accomplished its purpose. Chinese do not forget that.

THE UPRISING OF 1911

The empress dowager died in 1908. Her last days were filled with attempts at reform, she having been persuaded that only reform offered chance for the further survival of her dynasty. But reform came too late. After three years of enormous under-the-surface intrigue, the day for revolt came. This was the revolt of October 10, 1911. We are back where this chapter started.

The revolt of 1911 started in the cities of Wuchang,¹¹ Hanyang and Hankow.¹²

11. Wuchang, pronounced Woo-chang.

12. Hankow, pronounced as spelled.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

These three really form one city—something like New York, Brooklyn and Jersey City—sprawling across the great river, the Yangtze, at about the center of its course. If you were to cut out the map of China proper, as the eighteen provinces south of the great wall and east of Tibet are known, and then seek to put a pin through its center and whirl it as though on a wheel, the axis would be very close to these three cities. On the map, they mark the place where the railroad which will divide China running north and south, crosses the river which divides China running east and west. Right in this central spot the first explosion of the revolution of 1911 went off. Incidentally, this was the first great center that the revolutionary Cantonese set out to capture last year.

ENTER SUN YAT-SEN!

There was comparatively little fighting in 1911. The army around the three cities

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

revolted. (These three cities, by the way, are generally called, for the sake of convenience, the Wuhan cities. The name is formed from their first syllables—Wu-chang and Han-yang and Han-kow.) Then there came out from under cover a typical Chinese secret society, led by a southern Chinese doctor, Sun Yat-sen,¹³ who had spent all his life traveling about from one colony of Chinese in foreign lands to another, preaching the gospel of revolution and raising funds. This revolutionary secret society combined with the rebellious soldiers. Together they converged on the city of Nanking¹⁴ and captured it.

The word Nanking merely means "southern capital," just as Peking¹⁵ means "northern capital." With Nanking and the Wuhan cities, the revolutionists controlled all of China south of the

13. Sun Yat-sen, pronounced as spelled.

14. Nanking, pronounced as spelled.

15. Peking, pronounced as spelled.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Yangtze. They set up a provisional republican government, with Sun Yat-sen as provisional president. Then they looked northward to the tottering Manchu dynasty at Peking to see what the next move there would be. There was no next move. The dynasty — nominally headed at the moment by an infant—had nowhere to go but out. The Manchus called for the Chinese viceroy of the province of Shantung and told him to arrange the best terms of surrender possible.

ENTER YUAN SHIH-KAI!

This viceroy was named Yuan Shih-kai.¹⁶ Sixteen years before this China had suffered a humiliating military defeat at the hands of an upstart island nation she had always sniffed at, Japan. Yuan Shih-kai took the lesson of that defeat to heart. He began to build up his strength on the foundation of an army drilled in the western mode. In 1911, when the crisis

16. Yuan Shih-kai, pronounced Yoo-ahn Shih-kai.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

came, he had in his province of Shantung what was known as "the model army" of China owing personal allegiance to him.

Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionists had a provisional republic with a capital in Nanking. Yuan Shih-kai had a modern army in north China. The two parties started bargaining. The outcome was an agreement to proclaim China as a republic; to make Yuan the first permanent president; to let Sun and his followers write the constitution. It was on that basis that the so-called republic of China got under way in 1912, and was recognized by the other nations.

Up to this point there are just four things to remember: 1. That China is divided equally into north China and south China by the Yangtze river; 2. That the destruction of the Manchu dynasty was hastened by a century of foreign aggression; 3. That, when the empire fell, only fifteen years ago, it was followed by a republic, in which were two outstanding

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

men: Yuan Shih-kai, who was supreme in the realm of government, and 4. Sun Yat-sen, who was supreme in the realm of ideas. Yuan was typical of the conservative north China; Sun was the hero of south China. Sun wanted the capital brought back to liberal south China; Yuan kept it in the north, at Peking.

YUAN ELIMINATES SUN

Sun and his friends soon found that they had been sold out. Yuan had the army. He soon had the support of foreign nations, which meant that he had the money. And when Sun and his real republicans tried to make Yuan submit to the control of a modern democratic constitution, Yuan swept them off the map. Yuan, under the pretense of being an elected chief magistrate, soon became a military despot. The foreign powers stood behind him. They were convinced that what China needed was a strong-arm dictator.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Yuan's ace, in 1911, was, as we have seen, his modern-style army. This army after becoming "president," he expanded until he had units large enough to control the country located in each province. The commanders of these units were called tuchuns, or military governors, in distinction from the civil governors which each province was supposed to have. The theory was that the civil governor should administer the province and the military governor keep order. The fact was that the tuchun was as much of a despot over the province as Yuan was over the country as a whole. The tuchuns were lieutenants of Yuan's. He put them into their commands. They owed allegiance to him, personally.

This lasted until 1916 — four years. By that time Yuan felt that he had a strangle hold on the country. Sun Yat-sen and his group were out of the picture. Yuan's only real trouble seemed to be with Japan. The world war was on;

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Japan had run Germany out of China and had taken over the German holdings in Yuan's old province of Shantung; in 1915 Japan made a series of Twenty-One Demands on China that showed that she hoped, before the European powers got through with their struggle, to take over most of their former holdings and spheres and establish a virtual Japanese protectorate over China. Yuan hated Japan; Japan had no love for Yuan. That made the trouble worse.

YUAN'S FATAL MISTAKE

Then Yuan's foot slipped. He thought that he could deal with Japan more easily if he dropped the pretext of administering a republic and made China once again an empire, with his family as the new dynasty. "These Chinese," he reasoned, "are used to an emperor. This president stuff doesn't mean anything to them. I am emperor in everything but name anyway. Why not go the whole way?"

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Every person whom he approached on the subject thought it was a grand idea. There was even a farcical referendum of the provinces. Yuan proclaimed himself emperor.

But a large portion of the Chinese honestly wanted no more emperors. Presidents they knew little about, but they were fed up on emperors. Some of them, away off in Yunnan province, started a revolt. Yunnan is a province with only eight million people, and it lies away off in China's far southwest, a million miles from nowhere, so Yuan wasn't able to control things that far away very well. The revolt grew like the proverbial snowball. It rolled across Yunnan. It rolled down the Yangtze to the old familiar stamping-ground of the Wuhan cities and Nanking. (Whenever you want to stage a successful revolt in China you begin by capturing the Wuhan cities and Nanking.) Then it started from the river north for Peking. There were whis-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

pers that the Japanese were not as desolated with grief as they might be.

YUAN DIES

Some of the tuchuns, Yuan's lieutenants, saw a chance to get out from under the control of the old man and run their own armies. They either joined the snowball, or failed to throw their armies across its path. The snowball rolled closer, closer, closer to the walls of Peking. Observers began to rub their eyes in amazement. "By heaven," they cried, "the old fellow can't stop it! He's licked!" He was licked. Just before his destroyers reached him, he died. Some said that he died in a fit of apoplectic rage. Some said other things. To this day, nobody knows. But he died.

So, in the summer of 1916, just a little more than ten years ago, the first act in the present Chinese revolution came to an end. For when Yuan Shih-kai failed to establish his dynasty, it proved that China

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA


was too big, and too much permeated with a lot of new ideas, to make possible its control by any one-man despotism. The first thing the Chinese had to find out, after they ran out the Manchus, was whether or not that was just a move to make room for another personal dynasty. Yuan Shih-kai, whose face is still minted on the Chinese silver dollars, furnished the test. When Yuan's dream dissolved in ruin, Chinese might still wonder what the future held. But of one thing they were sure—the revolution was not going to eventuate in another empire.

II

WHAT PRODUCED CHINA'S NATIONALISTS?

WHEN YUAN SHIH-KAI died in the summer of 1916, he bequeathed to China a bumper crop of little Yuans. These were the tuchuns¹ who had been his old lieutenants. China proper has eighteen provinces and every Chinese province had a tuchun of its own. To each tuchun, Yuan stood as the perfect model. Just as his whole idea of government had been the mailed fist, so was theirs. Just as Yuan had not only not scrupled to betray the republic, but had failed to imbibe the faintest idea of what a republic is, so these little Yuans remained impervious to new

1. Tuchun, pronounced doo-jwin.



Why China Protested Against the Shantung Award

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

governmental ideas, and set out to rule in such high-handed fashion as their personal fancy dictated. They had four years of uninterrupted leisure in which to do what they pleased. It pleased them to bring China to the brink of utter ruin. There are a few of them still in action.

After Yuan had died, and his dynastical dream had evaporated, the republic was reestablished in Peking. When Yuan had first been made president, a vice-president had also been chosen. But he had been practically imprisoned from the time Yuan began to develop his monarchical ambitions. This vice-president was now brought back from his place of refuge and inaugurated as president, and the members of parliament were reassembled from the various hiding places into which Yuan had chased them and put back to writing a permanent constitution. The majority of these parliamentarians called themselves followers of Sun Yat-sen. The new presi-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

dent, Li Yuan-hung,² was a man of good intentions. He had been boosted into prominence by the accident of commanding the troops who had first revolted in the Wuhan uprising of 1911. Confronted during that crisis by his troops with the choice between joining them in their revolt or joining his honorable ancestors in the abode of the shades, he had chosen the former. It was enough, later, to make him vice-president.

EXIT LI YUAN-HUNG!

Poor Li Yuan-hung had a terrible time as president. The fundamental trouble was that he had no army on which he, personally, could rely. If he sent an order to a tuchun who, in the old days, had been held under Yuan's iron thumb, the tuchun would say to his subordinates, "Who is this Li? I never heard of him." And President Li, in his palace in Pe-

2. Li Yuan-hung, pronounced Lee Yoo-an-hung.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

king, had not quite as much real authority as the present president of Haiti.

Finally, one of these military buckaroos, a little harder boiled than the rest, said to the others, "Why do we put up with this fellow in Peking any longer?" The tuchuns applauded the sentiment. They suggested that the questioner run Li out of Peking. He started north, and actually captured Peking, drove out Li, scattered the parliament, and proclaimed the restoration of the boy emperor of the old Manchu dynasty, with himself as the guardian of the throne.

It is not necessary now to try to remember the name of the general who had this brief hour of glory in the summer of 1917. The thing that happened to him is what matters. He rose, spectacularly, to a position of control. He became the despot of Peking. But immediately, the other tuchuns who had egged him on to this adventure, saw the advantage he had obtained over them, and combined to drag

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

him down. Eight days after his triumph, he was defeated and driven out of Peking. He has been "out" ever since. But he had cleaned up enough to live in magnificent state for the rest of his life in that refuge of China's despoilers, the foreign concessions of Tientsin.³

WARS BETWEEN TUCHUNS

Now that, in essence, is just what went on in China year after year between 1916 and 1920. Various independent generals gained control of various provinces. Each drained out of his province all the wealth he could discover. Then some of these tuchuns grew ambitious. They made combinations with other generals to control larger territories. There were generally two major combinations in the field, contending with each other. Fighting went on during the good weather every summer. This fighting generally gave one combination the advantage, which

3. Tientsin, pronounced Tee-en-tsin.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

meant, simply, that it had more territory than the other combination to milk. But within each combination there inevitably appeared some leader. When this leader grew too strong, then the others—whether in his own combine or in the rival group—would band together to pull him down.

That is the meaning, and almost the only meaning, of the wars within China that you read about and puzzled about and could make no sense of in the summer of 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920. They were just personal forays, of individual generals or combinations of generals, against other generals. The prize being fought for was territory to be taxed. The principle involved was the sacred right of a freebooter to get his while he can.

THE ANFU CLUB

There is only one of those combinations of that period that needs to be designated by name. That was the so-called Anfu⁴

4. Anfu, pronounced An-foo.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

club. This was a combination of tuchuns which held great power in north China for years, finally disappearing from the stage only two years ago. This group deserves mention because it was the one that, at the period when Japanese penetration was most aggressive, sold for a song to Japanese companies natural rights which should have later enriched all China. The adjustments of concessions of that sort—which must come some day—is likely to cause considerable friction between China and other powers.

Puppet presidents came and went at Peking. The parliament was driven out of the capital. Tuchuns marched and counter-marched; rose to power; fell to obscurity. But in the meantime, foreign interests became more and more bold in their plans for obtaining control of China. In 1915, as has been told, Japan presented her Twenty-One Demands. So complete was the control which she would have secured had these been accepted by

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

China that western opinion, when informed first of their specifications, refused to credit them as true.

When the pressure of world opinion forced Japan to "postpone" the most drastic of these demands, she still continued her efforts at penetration. Through manipulation of the corrupt Anfu officials she obtained concessions of enormous value. From her base in Shantung she sent arms to bandit bands who continually terrorized north China. Through her system of Japanese post-offices, which stretched across the country, she developed a widely ramifying opium and morphine smuggling business. It was during this period that Japan won for herself the bitter enmity of most Chinese.

AMERICAN POLICY IN MODERN CHINA

The nations of Europe were too deeply involved in the world war to pay much attention to events in the far east. The United States, however, tried to act as a

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

sort of "best friend" for China in her unequal contest with rapacious foreign interests. American representations had much to do with inducing Japan not to force her Twenty-One Demands through to the finish. When America entered the war, China was induced to come in likewise, with the understanding that, as a belligerent, she would have a place in the peace conference where the fate of the former German colonies would be decided, and where the United States would watch out for her interests.

Then, out of a clear sky, China learned that the American secretary of state, Mr. Lansing, had signed an agreement concerning China with the Japanese Baron Ishii.⁵ Even the American minister in Peking knew nothing of this until handed the terms of the agreement by the Japanese minister there. And the agreement said, "The United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China." Or,

5. Ishii, pronounced Ish-ee-ee.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

in the eyes of the east, the United States had agreed to step aside and let Japan carry out her program for obtaining a paramount position. Americans protested against this understanding, but the Japanese went ahead on that basis. American prestige in China had suffered its first great blow.

THE SHANTUNG AWARD

The second blow came at the time of the formulation of the Versailles peace treaty. China's delegation fought bitterly the Japanese claim to the former German rights in Shantung province. They looked to the United States for support, all the other powers being bound by secret understandings not to oppose Japan. When it came to a show-down, President Wilson surrendered to the Japanese, and the German properties and concessions were transferred to the Japanese without qualification.

And then a miracle happened.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

China seemed, at the moment, more chaotic, more helpless than ever. The interminable and senseless tuchun fighting was going on as usual. In Paris, the diplomats who were about to sign the treaty, hinted that the Chinese protests did not amount to much because the Chinese delegates could not be sure whether they actually represented anybody or not. Then came word of the Shantung award. Trouble immediately broke out in the capital. Students poured out of the schools of Peking, into the streets, haranguing the crowds on the injustice about to be inflicted on their country. They formed processions and stormed the residence of the officials who had been most notoriously under Japanese influence. The students left all classes to give their time wholly to agitation against the government and against acceptance, by China, of the treaty. Other students in other cities followed the same course. Then business joined the

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

strike. Banks closed; every form of commerce was stopped for ten days. The whole nation went on strike to do two things: to register its protest against the terms of the Shantung award as written in the Versailles treaty, and to warn the government as to what would happen if it permitted Chinese representatives to sign that document.

The government hesitated for a few days as to what to do, and then surrendered. China's delegates at Paris were instructed not to sign the treaty, and did not. 'The students who had been arrested were released, with apologies. The government officials who had drawn student wrath were dismissed. And there blazed into flame all over the country, for the first time, a united passion of loyalty to China as China, and a determination to see her power so restored that she could maintain her dignity in the face of any enemy.

It was the Shantung award in the

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Versailles treaty more than any other one thing which first produced this modern crop of Chinese nationalists who figure so prominently in the news these days. Many other things contributed. Nor did the present nationalist movement come fully to birth with the events of 1919. The nationalists of 1919 can be identified with those of 1927 only in the sense that both put the restoration of China to a place of dignity among the nations at the forefront of their program. Now, in 1927, these nationalists have a definite and detailed program by which they hope to accomplish this for their country. In 1919 and 1920 they had only a newly-aroused passion, which expressed itself in attacking the nation which was at that moment apparently most interested in reducing China's status to that of a semi-dependent state. But the two types of nationalists—the 1919 crop and the 1927 crop—are essentially one and the same because the outburst which the students

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

and merchants made in that summer, when they learned how China's rights had been flouted in the gathering of the powers, was the beginning of the present movement.

THE BOYCOTT

The newly aroused nationalists of 1919 did not spend much of their energy in dealing with China's internal despoilers—not enough, perhaps. They put a considerable, but temporary, crimp into the operations of the Anfu club. But they gave most of their attention to the problem of how to deal with a foreign aggressor. For that task they forged a new weapon—the national boycott. Suddenly, the enormous structure of Japanese business in China, which had been built up during those war years when England, Germany, the old masters of that market, had been unable to hold it on account of war conditions, was shaken to its base. The blow to Japan's commercial interests

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

was so stunning that, taken in connection with the collapse of the Japanese military adventure in Siberia, the military party was forced to give up the strong-arm method.

From that hour Japan began to follow a different, and a conciliatory, line in China. Today, in all the confusion, it will be noticed that Japan is no longer a leader in shaking the big stick over China's head. When British and American gunboats bombarded Nanking, the Japanese gunboat alongside them withheld its fire. Japan has felt the effect of China's terrible boycott weapon. She is no longer the bully of the days of the Twenty-One Demands.

In this hasty way the story has been brought from the death of Yuan Shih-kai to the period immediately following the Shantung award in the treaty of Versailles. What are the high points to remember? Simply these: That following Yuan there came a series of personal

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

struggles for control between individual military leaders, without other significance than the temporary inconvenience which they caused within China; that at the same time the last great attempt of a foreign power to control China was made by Japan; that this attempt gave Japan the old German holdings in the province of Shantung, but aroused such fury among the Chinese that a nationalist movement began, which found its first weapon in the boycott. This weapon is still ready for use when China thinks she needs it.

Throughout this period, Sun Yat-sen and his followers were forced to return to the under-cover methods they had perfected during Manchu regime. But they were presently to re-emerge into the full sight of the world, as another chapter will show.

III

THE DAYS OF THE WAR LORDS

IN ONE WAY, the Chinese uprising against the Shantung award and the Japanese in 1919 and 1920 seemed just a flash in the pan. The students who had started it, and given it its driving power, were never able to repeat their success in later efforts to fashion public affairs. The boycott died a lingering death, as boycotts have a way of doing. And by 1921, the visitor in China would have found it hard to discover any trace of the nationalistic movements which had occasioned so much excitement a few months before. These movements were not really dead. They had merely gone under-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ground, or had transferred their energies to other enterprises. Presently, they were to reappear. But we have not reached that point in the story yet.

In the meantime, with the students out of the way, the stage was set for a new phase in China's revolution. This was the period of five years or so during which the so-called war lords dominated the scene. Who were these war lords? We have already talked about the tuchuns. Well, the war lords were super-tuchuns—generals who had extended their personal rule over whole groups of provinces. Several men, at one time or another, have aspired to places in this select company. There are only three of them, however, whom we need to distinguish. Their names are Chang Tso-lin,¹ Wu Pei-fu,² and Feng Yu-hsiang.³

1. Chang Tso-lin, pronounced Chang So-leen.

2. Wu Pei-fu, pronounced Woo Bay-foo.

3. Feng Yü-hsiang, pronounced Fung Yü (German umlaut) shiang.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

CHANG TSO-LIN

Chang Tso-lin is the war lord of Manchuria, and in many ways the most remarkable figure in modern China. His career reads like a page, or several pages, from the Arabian Nights. Chang is so small, his features so delicate, his hands—which he likes to gesture with to an unusual degree—so fragile, that he might easily be taken for some effeminate and harmless idler. He lives like a sybarite; jewels and jades entrance him; his robes are of bewildering magnificence; his feasts are unequalled in a country famous for its feasts. Rumor invests his harem with a size and splendor reminiscent of the caliphs of Bagdad. Altogether, Chang is a figure to have stepped directly out of a print, or better, down from a shelf of porcelains.

Yet Chang Tso-lin began his career as a bandit. He has probably slaughtered more humans than any other living Chinese—or than any Chinese who has

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

lived during the last fifty years. He has as little compunction about ordering, "Off with his head!" as had the Queen in Alice's Wonderland. And heads that he orders off have a way of coming off. Taken all in all, Chang Tso-lin is a good man not to fall afoul of. Of all China's war lords, he is the most reactionary, the most selfish, and the most ruthless.

HOW CHANG WON JAPANESE BACKING

Chang Tso-lin got his real start by the accident of location. He was at the head of a large and enthusiastic band of bandits in Manchuria in 1904 when Russia and Japan picked that province as the scene for their war. After sizing up the situation, he made up his mind that the chances favored Japan. He offered help, in various guerrilla ways, and Japan was glad to accept the offer. Chang made himself of real value to Japan during the hostilities, as an independent local chieftain of a band of desperadoes familiar

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

with every inch of territory, could. When the fighting was over, Japan rewarded Chang Tso-lin by having him and his bandits taken into the Chinese government service. (That has been a frequent way of disposing of bandits in China.)

You will recall that the principal result of the Russo-Japanese war—besides gaining for Mr. Roosevelt the Nobel peace prize—was the driving of Russia out of her dominant position in Korea and Manchuria, and the placing of Japan in her place. An old politician named Hsü Shih-chang⁴ was the nominal Chinese viceroy of Manchuria, but the real ruler was the Japanese resident. And, with the Japanese behind him, General Chang Tso-lin went shooting toward the top with all the rapidity of the owner's son who starts to "learn the business from the bottom up." So that, by the time of the student outburst in 1919, Chang Tso-lin

⁴ Hsü Shih-chang, pronounced Shü (German umlaut) Shih-chang.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

was the war lord of all Manchuria. He was still a Japanese protégé.

Now, if you will revert to what was said in the previous chapter, you will remember that the popular uprising of 1919 was directed against two supposed enemies of China, namely, the Anfu members of the government at Peking who were accused of having nefarious dealings with the Japanese, and the Japanese themselves. But the puppet president whom the Anfuites had in power at Peking at that time was none other than this old Hsü Shih-chang, for whom Chang Tso-lin had a warm feeling because of the way in which he had accepted him and smoothed his path to preferment when he was still looked down on in most quarters as nothing but an ex-bandit. In addition, Chang felt himself under obligation—and was—to the Japanese all the time. So, when the national movement of 1919 was directed against these two objects, it was inevitable that Chang should have thrown

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

himself against it. Even if he had had no personal obligations he would have done the same thing, for he will always oppose anything savouring of liberalism.

WU PEI-FU

The second of the great war lords has been Wu Pei-fu. He is as different from Chang Tso-lin as it is possible for a man to be. He has a strong, well-proportioned, masculine body. His personal tastes are simple; he dresses without ostentation; he eats sparingly; he lives as might any division commander. Even his enemies admit his personal honesty. His principal vanity is, I suspect, his old-school classical training. He knows the writings of the ancient philosophers and sages as only the Hanlin degree man of the ancient régime was expected to know them. In view of the general reputation borne by military men in China for near-illiteracy, Wu Pei-fu delights to astonish his visitors with subtle references to little

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

known passages in the literature of China's past.

It is impossible not to feel that Wu Pei-fu's military career has been a good deal of an accident. Left to himself it is likely that he would have chosen another type of career. But he came on the scene at a time when the army offered the quickest road to advancement—as is true under a revolution almost anywhere—and, after taking a military course in China and Japan, his actual powers carried him rapidly to the front. Wu Pei-fu is really a good general. He is a strategist of no mean ability, and he handles large bodies of troops well under fire. Unless it be the new Cantonese leader, Chiang Kai-shek, there is no Chinese general equal to him in military ability.

When the students proclaimed their uprising in 1919, Wu Pei-fu was in command of that old central, strategic part of China which converges on the Wuhan cities. He was not a member of the Anfu

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

combine in power at Peking. In fact, he was nominally only a division general owing allegiance to the tuchun of the province of Chihli,⁵ one Tsao Kun.⁶ Chihli is the province in which lies Peking, but Tsao Kun—also not a member of the Anfu club—had no authority inside that city. Wu Pei-fu, stirred as the students had been by evidence of treachery within the capital, started north to clean out the Anfuites in 1920. With that march he came full on the stage of national and international events for the first time.

FENG YÜ-HSIANG

We now have the first two in our cast of war lords introduced. The third, Feng Yü-hsiang, is a man of still another type. To begin with, he is a very large man, six feet tall and proportionately broad. He has come up from the ranks. The Chinese private soldier has generally

5. Chihli, pronounced Chee-lee.

6. Tsao Kun, pronounced Tsao Gun.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

been considered, by his compatriots, as the scum of the earth—and with reason—but Feng has proved that some leadership can come out of this school. Feng lives a life of extreme abstention, almost of asceticism, and enforces the same Spartan régime on all his officers. He likes to compare himself with Cromwell, and it is probable that his camps come closer to the ideals of the Puritans than any seen since the days of Marston Moor. Even smoking is prohibited among his troops.

Feng has had an enormous amount of advertising in the west because of his religion. He is a Christian. During the last year or two, the habit has grown of printing the tag almost always attached to his name, "the Christian general," in quotation marks. Partly, this is because the phrase has been so much applied to Feng that it has trade-mark qualities. But also, it is because some recent acts on his part make difficult explaining in the light of any Christian affiliations. More-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

over, whether Feng is a Christian or not, he is certainly working in close accord with Russia. And that is enough in these days to put any man under suspicion.

This much at least can be said about Feng's religion without danger of doing him an injustice: he regards himself as a Christian, but it is Old Testament Christianity that he understands. The parallel with Cromwell's Ironsides is irresistible at this point. Feng does a great deal of preaching and praying and even more ordering of the morals of his troops and of the inhabitants of the region in which he is camped. But the God that he serves is essentially the God who was familiar to Joshua and Jethro and Judas Maccabeus. There are signs that the missionaries already regret the advertising they have given Feng as the outstanding specimen of the success of their labors. This regret is likely to grow rather than diminish.

Feng Yü-hsiang did not enter the

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ranks of the war lords until late in the period of their power. At the beginning, he was really a very minor character, given a wholly fictitious rating because of his standing with the missionaries. When Wu Pei-fu first started fighting for national control, in 1920, Feng Yü-hsiang was only a brigadier-general. The brigade which he commanded was, it is true, the best in Wu's army. The chances are that it was the best in China. But it was only a brigade.

HOW THE FIGHTING BETWEEN WAR LORDS STARTED

Now, with our three war lords on the stage, let us see if we can reduce to some simple statements the way in which they played their parts. If we can be content to look at the spectacle only in the large, I think we can do so. Let us try it by annual divisions.

We begin seven years ago, in 1920. There are only two war lords. In fact,

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

as the action opens, there is only one, Chang Tso-lin, Japanese protégé and war lord of the fertile province of Manchuria, north of the great wall. But in central China is this doughty division general, Wu Pei-fu. The Peking government is under Anfu control, which both Wu and Chang—for different reasons which need not be given here—want to see cast out. Wu starts to attack Peking. With a much smaller army, he wipes the ground up with Anfu armies. At the same time, Chang marches south, through the great wall, and also approaches Peking. It is evident that Wu, if he means to dominate Peking alone, must fight Chang, and that he is not ready to do. Wu steps aside; his nominal commander, Tsao Kun, enters Peking with Chang; Chang is content with having given this demonstration of his power and retires to his own Manchuria.

Then six years ago, 1921. Wu has gone back to central China where he is

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

consolidating his personal position. Various minor campaigns give him the high-sounding title of inspector-general of the provinces of Hupeh,⁷ Hunan,⁸ and Szechwan,⁹ and vice-inspector-general of the provinces of Shantung, Honan,¹⁰ and Chihli. That makes six out of the eighteen of China's provinces, and if you will look on the map at their location you will see how they dominate northern, central and west China. In other words, to counter-balance the war lord in Manchuria we now have a second war lord south of the great wall, in China proper.

WU FIRST DEFEATS CHANG

Five years ago, 1922. The Washington conference is on. Chang Tso-lin puts a nominee in Peking as premier. The old Shantung question comes up again at

7. Hupeh, pronounced Hoo-buh (meaning, north of river).

8. Hunan, pronounced Hoo-nan (meaning, south of river).

9. Szechwan, pronounced Setch-wan.

10. Honan, pronounced as spelled.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Washington. China demands that Japan make good on her personal pledges to Woodrow Wilson to return to China full sovereignty in that province. Japan demurs. Chang's premier sends secret instructions to the Chinese delegates to accept the Japanese compromise. Wu learns of this and starts to attack Peking. Chang starts to its defense. So comes the first open war of the war lords. It is fought in north China. Chang immensely outnumbers Wu, but Wu is completely victorious, largely owing to the opportune arrival on the firing line of some of the troops of Feng Yü-hsiang. Wu throws out the old government in Peking, of which Chang's first patron, Hsü Shih-chang, has been the nominal head, and Li Yuan-hung, who figured in the last chapter, is called back from his retirement for another try at the presidency.

Four years ago, 1923. Feng, who has been promoted for his services the previous year, is now the general in actual

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

control of the city of Peking. Wu again withdraws to central China, and has little to do with politics. Li Yuan-hung, with no more military backing than he had before, makes another dismal failure of the presidency, and resigns. He is succeeded by Wu's old nominal superior, Tsao Kun, who is elected by a farcical parliament after outrageous bribery. In the meantime, Chang Tso-lin, beyond the wall, lies low, recovering from his defeat and preparing for a comeback.

FENG DESERTS WU

Three years ago, 1924. This is the year of the break between Wu and Feng, and the rise of the latter to true war lord stature. Wu is "mopping up" in the central China (Yangtze valley) section. There is an old ally of Chang Tso-lin's still in control of the province of Chekiang,¹¹ the sea-coast province that comes almost up to the gates of Shanghai. Wu starts to drive him out. Chang is by

11. Chekiang, pronounced Check-ee-ang.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

now ready to attack again. Just as Wu has his forces in place for the decisive campaign, Feng Yü-hsiang, who is holding the super-strategic post covering Wu's rear, deserts him. He rushes his army into control of Peking. There he turns out the so-called president, Tsao Kun, and imprisons him. Then he makes a deal with Chang Tso-lin, which puts a puppet of Chang's in the presidency, but leaves Feng in control of the capital. Wu retires to central China. He has never really been a major factor since this time.

Two years ago, 1925. Another year of consolidation on the part of everybody. No major developments until the end of the year. Then the campaign that developed may be summarized under the events of 1926.

A year ago, 1926. Wu moves north to attack Feng. Chang moves south to attack Feng. Feng is caught in a vise, and has to retreat, first to Peking, and then northwest from Peking into the

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

mountain passes leading into Mongolia. Here he is safe from attack. Wu gained little strength from this campaign. Chang gained north China, including Peking. He also has subordinates or generals of friendly disposition in control of the provinces lying along the lower stretches of the Yangtze river.

The constant maneuvering and counter-maneuvering, fighting and counter-fighting between the war lords has, by this time, taken the last vestige of authority or standing away from the government at Peking. The attempt to keep a government going there has degenerated into opera bouffé. And this is—if they only could see it—the real end of the war lord period. For while they will go on fighting, there is being turned loose on China in this summer (1926) another type of fighting force which will change the whole complexion of the story. But to get that new army into our view, we must go back to Sun Yat-sen. That will make the next chapter.

IV

SUN YAT-SEN

SO MUCH of glamour, so much of mystery, surrounds the name of modern China's hero that it will be well to give one chapter entirely to him. It is probable that no worthy life of this great Chinese patriot will be written until some Chinese writes it. And then, if he tells the truth, the same sort of harsh things will be said about him as are now being said about the writers whose biographies of Washington try to include all the facts. For Sun Yat-sen was one of the most contradictory and baffling persons who ever gained world fame.

A SON OF SOUTH CHINA

Sun Yat-sen—who, by the way, is gen-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

erally known among Chinese as Sun Wen—was born in that south China which has always been most cordial to liberal ideas. As a boy he lived in Honolulu, and was educated in a mission school there. Later he returned to China, where he became the first graduate of the college of medicine in Hongkong. He remained in China until 1895, by which time the Manchu authorities had made up their minds that he was doing a lot more political plotting than pill prescribing. He managed to get out of Canton just in time to miss an engagement with the lord high executioner.

From that day Sun became a wanderer on the face of the earth. Part of the time he was in America; part of the time in England; part of the time in Malaysia; part of the time nobody knew where he was. Once he was abducted in London and whisked into the Chinese legation, from whence he would undoubtedly have been transported to the next world had he

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

not managed to smuggle out a note which brought prompt interference from the British authorities. The Chinese minister was given to understand that Chinese methods of dealing with political plotters were not *au fait* in England. There was, in other words, no reciprocity about the extraterritorial system.

SUN'S SECRET SOCIETY

Sometime after the opening of the present century Sun Yat-sen organized a secret society, the purpose of which was to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. For years this plot was hatching under cover in every Chinese settlement outside China in the world. It was timed to come to a head in 1912. Sun Yat-sen went chasing up and down the earth gathering recruits and—what was more important—money. America and Malaysia proved his richest fields for solicitation.

Then, as we have seen, the revolution went off prematurely in China in Octo-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ber, 1911. Sun was in the United States when the news reached him, and immediately he started on a tour that included Chicago, New York, London, Paris and Singapore to rouse the clans. From Singapore it was but a step to his native Canton, and from there but another step to Shanghai. It was Christmas eve, 1911, when Sun landed in that city.

Sun Yat-sen found the stage well set for his re-entrance into his homeland. The republicans had just captured Nanking, and established their provisional government there. Almost without exception they had been members of or in touch with the secret society of which Sun was the founder and head. They regarded him as the true father of their revolution, and took it for granted that he would immediately take over the reins of government. This he did, being inaugurated at Nanking as provisional president. Around himself he gathered a cabinet of great strength.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

SUN RELINQUISHES PRESIDENCY

Then, as we have seen, in the readjustments between the old order and the new, the Manchus and the republicans, the conservative north and the liberal south, Sun stepped out of office to allow Yuan Shih-kai to become the first permanent president. His act of renunciation gained for him added acclaim in China, and a new measure of world interest. But he had cause soon to rue it.

Sun Yat-sen hoped to see introduced into China party government on the western model. He had, in his old secret society, the material for one party, which immediately came out from under cover and announced a party program under the name of the kuo-ming-tang.¹ You can translate that in any way you please. The three characters mean, in order, "country," "people," and "party." A people's country is the Chinese equivalent for a republic. So you can call the

1. Kuomintang, pronounced gua-ming-dang.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

kuomingtang the Chinese republican party, if you want to. It is, at least, the only true political party—as we know those organizations in the occident—China has known. It has existed, with varying fortunes, ever since Sun founded it. And it is very much in the news dispatches these days, for it looks as though it has a chance to establish itself in control of a government that will be a true government of China.

SUN REVOLTS AGAINST YUAN

Less than two years was all that Sun and his kuomingtang followers needed to discover that they had been duped by Yuan Shih-kai. Accordingly, in the summer of 1913, they raised the standard of revolt in Nanking. However, the country did not rally to them as they had hoped. Presently they were forced to surrender Nanking. Nanking, for the sin of having given the opponents of Yuan refuge, was treated to a sacking which far

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

outdid in savagery the events of March, 1927. The difference was that, in 1913, the Chinese were almost the sole sufferers, while this year foreigners were killed and foreign homes looted. Sun and other prominent leaders of the party fled for their lives to Japan.

Sun Yat-sen laid low in Japan until Yuan made his ill-fated attempt to establish himself as emperor. During that period he was involved in some putative deals with the Japanese, which caused some Chinese to question the purity of his patriotism. But Sun's explanation was like that which Lenin gave to the Russian revolutionists when taxed with taking money from the Germans. It made no difference to him, he said, where he got his money, so long as he got it. But money he must have. Once he had it, he would use it without regard to its source.

SUN RETURNS TO CANTON

When Yuan had brought the uprising

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

of 1915-16 on himself, Sun Yat-sen suddenly appeared in Canton and proclaimed the restoration of the original republic of China. All members of the first parliament (having been driven out of Peking long before that by Yuan) were invited to reassemble in Canton. But the adventure did not achieve great success. Yuan was brought down, but without Sun having contributed much to his defeat. The parliament was reassembled, but in Peking rather than Canton. And Li Yuan-hung, the vice-president who had been kept in confinement by Yuan and who now became president, seemed to be, for the moment, more of a popular hero than the veteran revolutionist in far-off Canton.

It would make this story too confusing to attempt to tell in detail all that happened to Sun Yat-sen during the next eight years. During this period the government in Peking, as has been shown, was gradually shaking itself to pieces.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

But Sun did not gather power in a ratio anywhere near that by which his Peking opponents lost it. He was altogether too erratic a man to be able to do that. Sometimes he had a strong group of supporters about him, and the government which he had proclaimed seemed to be gathering real strength. Again, he would so alienate support, even the support of his immediate associates, that he would be forced to flee from the city.

ON AGAIN; OFF AGAIN

As nearly as I remember, Sun Yat-sen set up his rump government in Canton four different times between 1916 and 1923. The procedure in each case was about the same. He would enter the city, give out a declaration of principles, proclaim the new government with himself as president. Then, after a period of dealing with local issues, he would employ such military forces as were at his disposal in an attempt to subdue some near-by

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

province. Sometimes these expeditions made headway; sometimes they didn't. In any case, things would go about so far; then there would be a break between Sun and his followers. Sun would return to Shanghai, where he would settle down at his home in the French concession, and await the next time to go to Canton and try again.

There are really only two events that need to be remembered from that period in Sun's career. Neither of them appeared of great importance at the time, but the effect of both will have international consequences for a long time to come. The first was when, in 1917, he made his passionate protest to Lloyd George against dragging China into the world war. It was really the United States which was most responsible for that act, but Sun still retained his affection for this country—which he then regarded as his model—and he placed the blame on Britain. He regarded the con-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ception of the war as a struggle to secure the rights of weak peoples as a piece of bald-faced deception — as events have abundantly proven — and the effort to drag China in as an international crime.

WHEN SUN TURNED TOWARD RUSSIA

The other episode came much later in his career when, in 1923, he demanded part of the customs revenue at Canton to support his government there. The foreign nations controlling the customs were turning the entire revenue over to the venal and tottering Peking government. With Sun in undisputed possession of Canton, he could not see why he should not have such income as the customs there brought in. But when he tried to levy on this source of revenue, an international flotilla of gunboats arrived on the scene. There were British, French, and Italian gunboats in the fleet, but by far the greater force was that brought to bear by the United States.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

It was then that Sun Yat-sen lost his faith in the United States. And it was then, likewise, that his restless mind, ever searching for new sources of support, began definitely to turn toward the Russians. This international shaking of the big stick saved for a disreputable Peking government the duties collected at a single customs house, but it cost the nations that did it more than will ever be computed.

One other thing that Sun had a hand in while at Canton needs recounting. Canton has, for years, been engaged in a bitter commercial struggle with the adjacent British crown colony of Hongkong. With the coming of the period following the world war this struggle passed into that of an open, knock-down-and-drag-out fight, with both sides using boycotts, embargoes, and every other conceivable weapon, short of actual resort to arms. In 1921, a great strike broke out among the Chinese sailors on the ships in Hong-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

kong harbor. Soon most of the shipping in the Pacific was tied up there. Sun actively fomented and supported this strike, which ended in the complete surrender of the shipowners, and inflicted on Hongkong the first of the commercial defeats which finally gave Canton a clear advantage in the struggle for commercial control of southern China.

THE DEATH OF SUN

In 1924, Sun Yat-sen left Canton for the last time. He left his son and others of the younger members of the kuomingtang in control of Canton, and of the province in which it lies, Kwangtung.² The old reformer was more than ready to turn over the reins of the kuomingtang government to younger men, for he was tired and sick, and he had found it impossible to get along easily with others in the detailed business of governing. The government that had, at the moment, been

2. Kwangtung, pronounced Gwan-dung.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

set up in Peking following Wu Pei-fu's great victory over the Anfu clique, invited Sun to come to Peking to discuss the unification of the entire country.

Sun made a leisurely journey northward. He spent some time in Japan, where he made some of the most startling anti-foreign pronouncements of his entire career. When he arrived in Peking, the scene had so changed that there was little for him to do in the way of consulting. Besides, he was a sick man. He went into the Rockefeller hospital, where he was found to be suffering from incurable cancer. For three months he kept himself alive by his own indomitable will. On March 12, 1925, he died.

Peking has seldom known more excitement than during the hours while the funeral of Sun Yat-sen was being planned. In his youth, Sun had been a Christian, and as his death approached he had given detailed instructions for a Christian burial service. Mrs. Sun is a

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Christian, and several of the members of the family are likewise. But the Russian influence in Peking was against a religious service, and the kuomintang party leaders felt that such a service would be impolitic. Moreover, the Anglican bishop of Peking, when approached, refused to be present at the funeral of the man whom he held to be responsible for the Hong-kong seamen's strike! However, the Christian burial was finally held, with the Rev. Timothy T. Lew, dean of the theological school of Yenching³ university, officiating.

BEING DEAD, HE SPEAKS

The strange thing about Sun Yat-sen is that he is undoubtedly more powerful dead than alive. As an administrator he was almost a complete failure. Intensely egoistic, he never could brook criticism or any counsel opposed to his own. Men who were with him at various stages of

3. Yenching, pronounced Yen-ching.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

his attempts to establish a government in Canton could—if they would—tell some weird tales of the way in which he would let his anger sweep him into the most ridiculous and indefensible actions. At a council one night, for example, he took umbrage at some decisions reached; withdrew; went aboard a gunboat in the river; and dropped a shell in the courtyard of the building in which his associates were still carrying on their deliberations! That was his way of registering dissent.

The best thing he ever did for the nationalistic movement was to turn the government at Canton over to the younger men in 1924. From that hour, Canton began to prosper. Sun's own son, Sun Fo, transformed the city into a modern municipality, with the best local government in China. His military secretary, a young general named Chiang Kai-shek,⁴ began, with the aid of Russian

4. Chiang Kai-shek, pronounced Chiang Gai-shek.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

instructors, to build a new army that was later to accomplish a military miracle of the first order. Within two years, the dream that Sun had fruitlessly followed since 1915—that from Canton a new national government might be launched—had been brought within sight of realization!

SUN YAT-SEN'S POLITICAL PRINCIPLES

But if Sun Yat-sen did not have the qualities of a good administrator, he had other qualities which give to his name an increasing significance as time passes. He was the political agitator par excellence. He could take abstract ideas and give them expression in such a fashion as to fill the minds and capture the imagination of his countrymen. For that reason, since his death he has become almost a legendary, superhuman figure for most Chinese. Every Monday morning in all the schools in territory under control of the kuomingtang, the children stand as

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

they do to salute the flag in American schools, and then, led by the teacher, recite the "three principles" mentioned in the public "will" of Sun Yat-sen:

"I, Sun Yat-sen, have served the cause of the people's revolution for forty years, in which my constant object has been to secure liberty and equality for our country. From the experiences of these forty years, I have come to the realization that, in order to reach this object, it is necessary to awaken the masses of our people, and to join hands with those countries in the world which are prepared to treat us as equals in our fight for the common cause.

"At present, we have not yet completed the work of the revolution, and it is my sincere hope that all our colleagues will continue the fight for ultimate realization of our goal, in accordance with the plan for national reconstruction, the program of national reconstruction, the 'three people's' principles, and the declaration of the first national conference, which has been drawn up by myself. Recently I have proposed the convening of a national people's conference and the abolition of the unequal treaties, and we should especially work toward the realization of these aims within the shortest possible period of time. The above is my will.

SUN WEN."

It is the "three principles" mentioned

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

in this document which give the present Chinese revolution its platform. These three principles, as Dr. Sun explained them at length in the first national pronunciamento of the kuomingtang, occupy a place in Chinese thinking analogous to that of the declaration of independence in the mind of Americans. The three principles for which Chinese patriots say they are fighting are: the principle of nationality, in which they include the full independence of China, and full racial equality for all races within the republic; the principle of people's rights, in which they include all the requirements for a modern, self-governing democracy; the principle of the people's living, in which they include the equalization of land ownership and the regulation of capitalism in industry.

These phrases may look innocent enough on paper. But ask almost any Shanghai merchant about them and the atmosphere will begin to take on a sul-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

phurous tinge. For these are the ideas that lie at the bottom of the present trouble in China. And these ideas were given formal utterance by Sun Yat-sen.

V

WHAT IS THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT?

WE HAVE NOW COVERED rapidly the important events in China's recent history, up to the beginning of the present nationalistic phase of her revolution. We started with the Manchu dynasty, and saw that when the western nations began their aggressive approach to China this dynasty was entering on the century of decline which ended with its abdication in 1911. Then, out of the revolution of that year, here emerged two important figures—men who were important more for what they personified than for what they were. One of them was Yuan Shih-kai, who meant a China ruled by the iron hand of

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

military power. The other was Sun Yat-sen, who meant a China ruled by the ideas of a modern democratic state. Yuan died, and bequeathed to China a period of fighting among tuchuns and war lords, which we hope is now coming to an end. Sun died, and bequeathed to China a nationalistic type of conflict, the outcome of which no man can yet see. In this chapter, we will attempt to give the important aspects of this second conflict.

CANTON VS. HONGKONG

We go back to Canton. Sun Yat-sen, as we have seen, left Canton in 1924 on that last journey to Peking, where he died early in the following year. He had not been a brilliant success as ruler of Canton, nor of the province of Kwangtung in which that city lies, nor of the small bits of adjoining territory which, at one time or another, his military forces had conquered. (Most of these were held only for short periods.) But he left a series of doctrines

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

which his followers in the kuomintang had taken deeply to heart. As soon as Sun Yat-sen left Canton these followers—most of them comparatively young men—began to show genuine ability as administrators.

They inherited Canton's old quarrel with Hongkong. This had been embittered when Sun Yat-sen gave open support to the seamen's strike which pulverized Hongkong's business in 1921. As labor troubles in the British crown colony increased after that, the neighboring Chinese port was held responsible—and with a good deal of reason. Soon, the bitterness reached the point where one port was placing an embargo on the contents of any ship which touched at the other port. It even looked on one or two occasions as though the British business interests in Hongkong would be able to persuade their home government to use gunboats either to blockade Canton or to bombard her. This trade war raged right

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

down to the outburst of the national anti-British boycott in 1925. That gave the Cantonese a clear commercial victory.

The younger members of the kuomintang, while tormented with this trade war with Hongkong, turned themselves also to the internal reorganization of the government of Canton. Here they were as successful as Sun Yat-sen had been otherwise. The old city walls were torn down and broad boulevards built in their place. Modern police methods were introduced; public health work was begun. Canton, under kuomintang rule, became the best administered Chinese city in China.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN CANTON

At the same time, a new influence began to make itself felt in Canton. This was Russia. We have already seen how the naval demonstration by foreign warships when Sun Yat-sen threatened to take a part of the Canton customs' receipts turned Sun against the nations of the

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

west. Other attempts by other kuomintang leaders to secure financial help or advice from western sources are also said to have been made at this time, and to have failed. Great Britain, under Hongkong pressure, would naturally do nothing that might help Canton. And, where Great Britain held back, the other nations did not feel free to step forward.

With Russia it was otherwise. Russia was looking for just such a chance as this offered, not only to make friends with an important Chinese group, but equally to embarrass the British, whom the Russians regarded as their ultimate opponents. So Russia was ready to offer advisers for Canton's various departments, and instructors for Canton's new military school. Since the army trained by these instructors has won its remarkable victories, and since the diplomacy conducted with the help of these advisers has put this kuomintang government in its present position of power, is it any wonder that

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

the nationalists do not pay much heed to present foreign demands that they break such ties as bind them to the Russians?

It took the kuomintang about eighteen months after Sun Yat-sen left Canton to get ready for adventure on a larger stage. During that time it had overcome the commercial threat of Hongkong; it had consolidated the local government; and it had trained new leadership for a new army. At the same time, however, two other developments were in progress which have had much to do with subsequent events. We will take just a moment to look at these.

GROWTH OF CHINESE LABOR MOVEMENT

The first was the growth of the modern Chinese labor movement. Modern industry has come into China with a rush during recent years. Many cities have begun to assume the outward aspects of the manufacturing cities of the west. Those Wuhan cities, to which we have re-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ferred, have, for example, come to be known as the Pittsburgh of China, because of the enormous iron and steel works there. At the start this industry cruelly exploited the Chinese labor it employed. Why not? Chinese were cheap. Where men by the millions live within sight of starvation they will fight with each other for a wage of a few cents a day.

But the Hongkong seamen's strike of 1921 showed these Chinese workers that the big industrial corporations were not invincible, and that, properly organized, labor could demand and secure better wages even in China. The seamen's strike was followed by the organization into labor unions of hundreds of thousands of workers in all the budding industrial centers of China. Strike after strike was called, and so great was the margin of profit on which the industries had been operating, and so genuine the power of the new labor movement, that not a single important strike was lost! By the sum-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

mer of 1925 this labor movement had attained a place of national importance.

THE MASS EDUCATION MOVEMENT

A second development of almost equal importance was of what is known as the mass education movement. Experiments made with Chinese coolies working behind the lines in France during the world war showed that it was possible, in a few weeks of night study, to teach adult coolies to read and write the thousand most-used Chinese characters. This thousand-word literacy might not equal, in cultural attainment, the vocabulary of a Confucius. But it does approximate the literacy of a New York tabloid reader. A graduate of one of the thousand-character schools finds it easily possible to read the simple newspapers, magazines and books which are now being provided for his use.

By the summer of 1925 there had already been graduated from the thousand-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

character schools about three million hitherto illiterate Chinese. These schools were, supposedly, non-political. But their text-books were as strongly nationalistic as the textbooks of any country are bound to be. And their graduates became not only familiar with the current gossip of politics, and were given the nationalistic viewpoint as to China's relations with the rest of the world, but they became agents for passing these things on to others. It is hardly too much to say that, without actual design, these mass education schools permeated the masses in large sections of China with the ideas of the kuomintang.

STUDENTS SHOT IN SHANGHAI

Now, with all this in the background, we can come to the summer of 1925. That spring had been marked by increasing labor troubles. These were especially severe in Shanghai. There the students combined with the strikers from a Japanese-owned cotton mill to force the work-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ers' grievances on the attention of that very unsympathetic foreign community. The foreign police force, enforcing a municipal regulation, broke up a mass-meeting called to signalize the shooting of a striker by a mill foreman, and arrested students taking part in the meeting. Other students then came, in a crowd, to the police station to demand that they too, as having been equally guilty, be locked up. In the confusion, a British police officer gave the order to fire, and the police did fire point blank into the unarmed crowd.

This took place on May 30, 1925. The day has become famous in Chinese history. The time will probably come when China will have streets named after it, just as countries of Europe and Latin America have streets named after days when events of national importance took place. The shooting of unarmed students by these foreign-commanded policemen seemed to bring all the smouldering resentment against the privileged position of for-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

eigners in China to open flame. The disorders in Shanghai—which went on for more than a week, during which the Chinese reported that scores of additional Chinese were killed—were matched in Hankow, in Canton, and in other settlements where there were numbers of foreigners. More than fifty Chinese were said to have been killed by machine-gun fire from the foreign settlement at Canton.


CHINA FOR THE CHINESE

Within a month, all China was seething with anti-foreign agitation. Up in north China the two war lords, Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yü-hsiang, who had been preparing to fly at each other's throats, found it much wiser to drop their private war and spend their time proclaiming their devotion to the principles which the students announced of "China for the Chinese." All the ways in which the Chinese had suffered at the hands of foreigners were dug up, and expounded until the

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

most ignorant country coolie had learned that he was a victim of foreign aggression. And when, after much too long hesitation, the foreign authorities in Shanghai finally got around to offering damages to the families of the students shot there, they found that the Chinese were no longer interested in those personal and minor scores. They demanded now the end of all the treaties which they felt placed China in an inferior position among the nations.

This was the start of the present nationalistic movement. It began with the reaction against the student shootings in Shanghai in the early summer of 1925. It at once became a demand for the end of the old treaties governing the relations of China and other nations. It was directed chiefly against Great Britain, and it used the boycott as its principal weapon. Before the end of that summer the British merchants of Hongkong alone reported to their home government that in three



WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

months they had lost fifteen million pounds sterling! By the end of the year British business in China was shot full of holes, and British merchants in the far east were declaiming the need for action.

But the worst was yet to come. The kind of situation which has been sketched played directly into the hands of the kuomingtang at Canton. Here was the country seething with anti-foreign, patriotic fervor. Here were labor unions itching for a chance to show their power over foreign corporations. Here were the graduates of the mass education schools aflame with newly imbibed patriotic ideas. And here was a party with a definite program for national action. The leaders of the kuomingtang felt that the time had come to make their great adventure. In the early summer of last year, 1926, they ordered their army to march northward and strike for the control of China!

THE CANTONESE CAMPAIGN

What followed was nothing less than a

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

military miracle. Starting from Canton in midsummer, the Cantonese army was in control of Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, inside of two weeks. That meant that an army of almost a hundred thousand men had been transported, almost without the help of a railway, four hundred or more miles through mountainous country, in some places so difficult that there were only trails on which men must walk in single file, where the maintenance of communications was next to impossible, and that they had then been thrown into action and had won. From Changsha¹ the next advance was two hundred miles farther north to the river. There, in the familiar Wuhan sector, the Cantonese army, now reinforced by soldiers from Hunan, came into conflict with Wu Pei-fu.

The fight here was much more bitter and longer in doubt. Wu held on stubbornly. But the Cantonese—who now

1. Changsha, pronounced Chang-shaw.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

preferred to call themselves nationalists—were fighting with the spirit of crusaders, and before the end of October they had the strategic Wuhan cities in their possession. Instantly other parts of the country fell under their influence, when such a general as Feng Yü-hsiang in the northwest, or the generals in control of the province of Szechwan, made alliances with them. And then, using Hankow as a base, the nationalist army swept eastward down the river “mopping up.” Early in March, Shanghai fell into their hands. During the last week in March they captured Nanking.

TROUBLE AT NANKING

The capture of Nanking was attended by the first clearly anti-foreign excesses on the part of the nationalists' troops. It is now said that the looting of foreign homes which took place there was the work of Hunanese. Hunan has been notoriously anti-foreign for years, and it is

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

possible that this is true. But there are others who hold that, when the conquerors of Nanking began to loot the foreigners' homes there, they were deliberately attempting to provoke reprisals from the foreign naval vessels which were in the Yangtze river off that city. If they could trap the foreign warships into firing, they believed that the entire country could be roused to an open campaign to drive the foreigners out of China.

Whatever the truth as to the motives behind the Nanking looting, it is clear that, at the present moment, there are two parties within the nationalist movement. One of these is composed of those who believe that the only way in which to deal with foreigners is with military force—that this is the only argument the westerner understands. The other is composed of a moderate group that believes that the foreign nations realize that the time has come when they must give up their old special privileges in China, and

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

that, since they realize this, it will prove possible to secure by negotiation all that China desires to gain in the righting of her international relations.

THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN THE KUOMINGTANG

For the moment, therefore, the military campaign in China is slowing down while the nationalists find out which of these two groups is to control that movement. The moderates appear the stronger just now, for their leader is Chiang Kai-shek, the commanding general of the nationalist army. While General Chiang has not been a personal leader—in the sense that the tuchuns and the war lords have been personal leaders—he holds the loyalty of a large portion of the nationalist army because of the victories which he has won. His headquarters are at Nanking, and there he is attempting to set up a moderate kuomingtang government.

But the more radical wing of the party,

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

now in control of Hankow, also has some troops. This wing declares that General Chiang Kai-shek is going the way of the old tuchuns; that he has thrown off party control, and is out to make himself a military dictator. So the two wings are thrusting back and forth at one another. They have done no fighting as yet, but fighting may begin at any time. Or, on the other hand, the whole trouble may be smoothed out, and the nationalist movement may again become as united as it was when the advance was under way from Canton to the Yangtze.

If this comes to pass, the chances are that Chang Tso-lin, last of the war lords, will soon be swept north of the great wall into his old Manchurian stamping-ground. Then the kuomingtang will declare itself in control of all China, and will ask recognition from the other nations as China's true government. And then it will remain to be seen whether this party of young idealists, who have so skillfully

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

used the program of Sun Yat-sen to arouse the enthusiasm of the Chinese masses, can put that same program into practice in such a way as to bring those masses the peace and decent living conditions they crave.

VI

CHINA AND FOREIGN NATIONS

IN PREVIOUS CHAPTERS we have traced the developments in China from the time the Manchu régime began to break up down to the present minute, when the nationalists have conquered the entire country south of the Yangtze river. We have said that it depends on how much unity can be secured within the nationalist ranks as to whether and how rapidly that movement can proceed to run the last war lord, Chang Tso-lin, out of north China. But now there are some questions of a different kind that need asking. We have talked only in terms of the Chinese themselves. Any newspaper reader knows that the

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

present Chinese situation is made up, in part, of the Chinese and their aspirations, and in part of the foreign nations and their policies.

To discuss the position of the foreign nations in China adequately would take several thick volumes. I will not pretend to do that. Instead, for the sake of clearness, I will ask five simple questions, and then try to answer them, in order. These are the questions: Why are the Chinese anti-foreign? Why are they especially anti-British? How do they feel toward the Japanese? How do they feel toward the United States? Why do they favor the Russians? When I say Chinese in these questions, I mean Chinese nationalists.

THE BASIS OF ANTI-FOREIGNISM

Why are the Chinese anti-foreign? Their spokesmen will say that they are not. In one sense that is probably true. The individual Chinese is probably as

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

good-natured, peace-loving, fair-minded an individual as there is on earth. Approach him as an individual, and treat him decently, and the chances are that you will get along with him very well indeed. Toward you, as an individual, he will show no anti-foreign feeling. Indeed, he is likely to go out of his way to show you goodwill. The foreigners whose homes were destroyed at Nanking this year testify to the risks that individual Chinese ran to protect them, and the lengths to which the Chinese went to express their sorrow at the troubles that had come on them as individuals.

But that does not change the main fact that Chinese nationalism, as a movement, is anti-foreign. It is anti-foreign because its leaders have become convinced that there can be no strong Chinese state while foreign powers retain the positions which they now hold in China. Remember that there is only one port adequate for fleet use on China's long coast in which she can

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

today mobilize a navy without securing foreign permission! Remember that she cannot bring to trial a single one of the thousands of foreigners within her borders, no matter of what crime he may be accused, except in the case of those nationals whose governments have given up their extraterritorial status. Remember that she cannot even raise the tariffs which might protect her infant industries from foreign competition without securing the unanimous consent of twelve foreign nations!

It is the unequal treaty that makes China anti-foreign. The unequal treaty puts the foreigner in China above the law. It even puts the convert to the foreigner's religion in a preferred position before the law. It imposes on China trade restrictions which would never be imposed on a nation that was regarded as truly sovereign. When the five nations presented their identic notes, demanding satisfaction for what had happened to foreigners at

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Nanking, Mr. Eugene Chen, the foreign minister of the nationalist government, answered that, if it was desired to lessen the danger to foreigners in China, the way to do it was to get rid of the old unequal treaties. He was telling the truth.

WHITE RACIAL ARROGANCE

One other thing needs to be said in answering this question. In part, nationalist China is anti-foreign because of the old treaties. But in part—and, personally, I believe in larger part—she is anti-foreign because of the racial arrogance of the foreigners. A large part of the foreign community in China has acted as though it regarded itself as socially superior to the Chinese. Chinese have not been eligible for club memberships; Chinese have not been received as dinner guests; Chinese have not been allowed to occupy better class accommodations in hotels or on river steamers. The white man has treated the coolie with a disdain that he

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

has taken no trouble to conceal. In a city like Shanghai, Chinese have been excluded from the parks.

The tale of the way in which the white man has shown his feeling of racial superiority might be extended indefinitely. It is all a part of the "damned nigger" period of colonial expansion. That period has now, definitely and forever, come to an end. "We will treat you as demi-gods no longer," said a Chinese at the Institute of Pacific Relations held in Honolulu in 1925. But so long as the white man shows that, under the surface, he still feels that, as compared with a yellow man, he ought to be regarded as a demi-god, the orient will be anti-foreign.

CHINA AND THE BRITISH

Why are the Chinese nationalists so anti-British? Here again, the answer is twofold. The racial element again enters, for while there are Britishers in China who take care not to wound the susceptibilities

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

of the Chinese, the common reputation of the British is otherwise. Get a Chinese started talking about the slights he has suffered on account of his race—and it is altogether too easy to start him on such a subject these days—and the chances are large that the villain in his little drama will prove to be a Englishman. It is the Britisher who has acquired a reputation for pushing Chinese off sidewalks if they happened to cross his path, or for using his cane across the back of rickshaw pullers who annoyed him by the slowness of their gait. And while Britons will not like it, they might as well be told without reserve that one reason why their nation is, at this hour, especially disliked by the Chinese is this racial reason.

The other reason for the anti-British feeling is the extent of the British holdings acquired under the old régime. If China is today anti-foreign because of the old treaties and concessions, it follows inevitably that she will be anti-British, since

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Britain has been the conspicuous beneficiary of those treaties and concessions. The foreign enclaves in China, whatever their legal status, are really British outposts. It is the British who talk most about the necessity of upholding white prestige, as well as their former commercial advantages, in the far east. The Chinese feel instinctively that if they can blast the British out of the position they have acquired in China during the last century, the other nations will give up whatever special privileges they may have secured almost without a struggle. They could not, therefore, be Chinese nationalists and not be anti-British.

A NEW JAPANESE POLICY

How do the Chinese feel toward Japan? It is taken for granted in the west that the Chinese are bitterly anti-Japanese. I doubt very much whether that is true. There is undoubtedly a great deal of suspicion of Japan dormant in China. Given

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

the provocation, this might easily burst out again into active opposition. But just at present dislike of Japan is lessening. If the Japanese government deals wisely with this situation, it may shortly find that it has a friendly country at hand with which to do business.

To understand this, it is necessary to notice the change that has come in Japanese policy on the Asiatic mainland since 1920. In 1920 nine out of every ten Chinese were openly, and often vociferously, anti-Japanese. They would not do business with a Japanese nor knowingly use a Japanese product. The boycott then instituted made a wreck of Japanese business in China. And Japan's economic future is largely dependent on her business in China. At the same time that Japan was receiving this drastic economic lesson in China, her military men were undergoing an equally humiliating rebuff in Siberia. On the heels of that came the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alli-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ance, in which Great Britain turned away from her former Japanese connections. And on the heels of that came the American rebuff in the immigration law.

Under the impulse of those four blows, Japan did two things. She turned her entire foreign policy to point toward Asia rather than the west, even seeking relations with bolshevist Russia. And she made up her mind that a policy of courtesy, patience, and reciprocity would carry her further in China than would a policy of demands, threats, and military pressure. She is still holding to this new policy, although she has been strongly tempted to go back to the old strong-arm methods by events of recent months. When British and American warships fired at Nanking, the Japanese warship kept silent, even though the Japanese consulate had been looted and the consul attacked. The influence of these things is slowly being felt in China. Even nationalist China—much as she may remem-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ber the Twenty-One Demands and similar episodes—does not hold Japan in any peculiar antagonism these days.

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

How does the Chinese feel toward the United States? It must be confessed that American prestige in China is at a low ebb. A series of inept diplomatic moves has almost destroyed the feeling that existed for years that the United States, in some peculiar way, would act as best friend for China in her contacts with other western nations. This began when, while the world war was on, the United States signed the Lansing-Ishii agreement, recognizing "that Japan has special interests in China." The prestige of the United States suffered again when the Shantung clauses were written into the treaty of Versailles. The Washington conference served to restore American standing, but the failure to carry into effect the resolutions concerning China for three years

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

after that conference adjourned largely offset this gain.

The lead which the United States took in denying to Sun Yat-sen his proposal in regard to the Canton customs did not do America's standing any good. And the 1925 ultimatum concerning the use of the forts at the Taku bar, near Tientsin, when the United States took the lead in threatening naval action within forty-eight hours, still further shook Chinese confidence. Since the present phase of the revolution began to develop—that is, since May 30, 1925—American prestige has been constantly going down. For a time the opinion of a majority of individual Americans in China seemed to favor the nationalists, and America gained in favor accordingly. But American business interests have taken so outspoken a stand against the nationalistic movement; American diplomatic and consular officials have been so icily regular; in recent weeks some of the American missionaries have

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

been so hesitant, if not openly antagonistic, in their attitude, that America has come to be lumped with those nations whose primary interest in China is the securing of settled markets, whether for the winning of dollars or the winning of souls.

RUSSIA'S POSITION IN CHINA

That brings us to the last question: Why do the Chinese nationalists favor Russia? The answer is very simple. During this period when China has been stirred by a new national consciousness, she has called on the other nations of the world to release her from the treaty bonds placed on her during the years when she was still a "sleeping giant." The nations that were represented in the Paris peace conference and the Washington conference have all assured her of the righteousness and reasonableness of her desires. But they have done nothing. They have held conferences with her, to be sure, but these conferences have ended only in re-

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ports giving reasons why the rectification of treaty inequities must be longer postponed. Russia in contrast, has actually and voluntarily given up her old treaty rights in China.

There are several other nations that no longer have extraterritorial advantages for their nationals in China. Among them are Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and now, Belgium. But these nations either lost their special rights as a result of the world war, or treaties expired and the Chinese refused to renew on the old basis, or they are new nations that have made new treaties in this period during which China is no longer signing away her sovereignty. Russia alone among the nations has stepped forward, voluntarily asked for a revision of all treaties, and voluntarily given up all her concessions and her extraterritoriality.

Foreign critics have not been wanting to point out minor inconsistencies in Russia's announced program of equal and fair

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

dealing. It is possible to show, by analyzing the new treaty for control of the Chinese Eastern railway, for example, that Russia has not become the international philanthropist that some of her propagandists would paint her as being. But China does not pay much attention to these criticisms. She views the whole Russian policy in the light of the whole policy of the other nations. And the resultant contrast makes her, inevitably, pro-Russian.


RUSSIAN HELP FOR THE KUOMINGTANG

At the same time, Russia's own international policies have made her a strong supporter of the Chinese nationalist movement during this period when that movement needs friends, and is doubly grateful to those whom it can find. Six years ago it became plain to Russia that she could hope for very little in the way of allies or friendship in western Europe. Of necessity, she had to turn her face

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

toward the east. From that hour she has been wooing China. But she had nothing to gain from friendship with the Japanese-dominated Chang Tso-lin or the British-dominated Wu Pei-fu. She, therefore, naturally made advances toward the leaders of the groups who still lacked foreign supporters. So in the north, she made a friend of the new war lord, Feng Yü-hsiang. And in the south, she put herself out equally to win the confidence of the kuomintang.

It is to be doubted whether any responsible element in the Russian government is expected, or seriously working to produce, in this generation, through the kuomintang, a communist state in China. Russia will be content with much less than that. All she wants is a friendly state. She will hardly be adverse, of course, to the presence of such strong supporters as a communist wing in the kuomintang would give her. But a government that is pro-Russian only in the sense of believ-



AS OF MAY 15, 1927

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ing in Russia's sincerity, her generosity, and her friendship, is all that she is really after at this stage of the game. And that, with the other nations so bitterly opposing every advance of the nationalists, and with her advisers so constantly proving their astuteness and actual helpfulness to the kuomintang cause, she has every chance of securing.

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No living man can tell what turn the Chinese situation will take tomorrow. Elements here unmentioned may be the most important elements in the situation by the time this has been printed. If, for example, the declaration by Great Britain and the United States of their determination to protect the property as well as the lives of their nationals should lead to military intervention, then the outcome would be beyond calculation. I can only write of the situation as it stands at this hour.

If China is left alone to work out her own salvation, one thing seems sure. She

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

seems safely by the period of personal military adventurers. Even Chiang Kai-shek, if he tries that game, will not last long at it. It is only as a military leader in a cohesive movement that Chiang Kai-shek has importance. Chang Tso-lin will soon be a back number. Feng Yü-hsiang is just now of minor interest. Wu Pei-fu is unlikely to come back. The Chinese may follow one path or another in their search for a new political order—they may try a democracy, a soviet union, a confederation of autonomous provinces, or some new type of political organization still to be developed. But whatever they finally settle down to try, the chances are small that they will return to any strong-man autocracy.

VII

IN A NUTSHELL

SIXTEEN YEARS AGO (1911) the decadent empire of China, under pressure from without and within, fell.

This left a vast country, containing a quarter of the world's population, adrift.

Two types of leadership were offered this country: (1) The leadership of personal authority, exemplified in Yuan Shih-kai, (2) The leadership of democratic ideas, exemplified in Sun Yat-sen.

China chose the first.

Accordingly, it had its period of strong-man rule, under Yuan Shih-kai—

Who died after vainly attempting to found a new empire—

And left a crop of lesser imitators, called war lords and tuchuns, among them such outstanding ones as Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin—

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Who have spent nearly ten years quarreling and fighting among themselves until at last they have succeeded in practically eliminating each other.

But in the meantime—

The dream of a China built on democratic ideas persisted.

It was kept alive by Sun Yat-sen and his followers in a political party called the kuomingtang—

Which made its headquarters in Canton, in south China—

And spent almost ten years building up its strength there, while the war lords were spending the same period exhausting their strength fighting each other in north China.

Likewise, in the meantime—

Events, happening under the surface, were preparing all China for a new day. We lump these events together as the birth of a new nationalism, which was fostered by—

The growth of the student movement;

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

The growth of the mass education movement;

The growth of the labor movement;

The growth of the anti-foreign movement.

This anti-foreign movement owed its growth to such things as—

The remembrance of ancient wrongs at foreign hands;

Modern wrongs, such as the Japanese Twenty-One Demands; the Shantung award; the Shanghai student shootings;

The unequal treaties;

White racial arrogance.

All these things came to a head last year (1926) when a nationalist movement, sponsored by the kuomintang, started from Canton—

And traveled north until it reached the Yangtze river—

Then east until it reached the Pacific ocean—

Thus conquering all the territory in the

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

southern half of China, which is now under nationalist rule—

Eliminating the war lords who were south of the river—

And leaving only one war-lord in China north of the river (Chang Tso-lin) whose final authority, if he retains any at all, will be north of the great wall.

However, at the moment, the nationalists are divided between two parties—

A moderate party, which believes that China can adjust her relations with other nations through negotiation, and—

A radical party, which believes that China must use the same methods with foreign nations that she is using with her own war-lords.

If the moderates win, then foreigners should be able to adjust themselves to a new situation in China without long delay.

But if the radicals win, then the foreigners will have either to (1) surrender their rights without dispute, or (2) fight.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

And—

It depends largely on the success which the moderates have in dealing with the foreigners whether China as a whole finally—

Goes moderate or radical.

A Geographical Postscript
A MIND MAP OF CHINA

FOR THOSE whose minds work in geographical fashion, there is no better way of beginning a study of China than by forming in the mind a map carrying the general features of that country. It is not hard to do this, following some such method as this:

We know, in a hazy sort of way, that if we were to start from the western coast of the United States and travel directly west we would ultimately land on the eastern coast of China. If we started from a port near the northern end of our coast—Seattle, for instance—we would find ourselves coming to land about six hundred miles north of Vladivostock on the Siberian shore. We would then have to press inland two hundred miles before we found

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ourselves in Chinese territory, somewhere in northern Manchuria. But if we started from a port at the southern extreme of our Pacific coast—say, San Diego—we would come to land some distance north of Shanghai, with half of the China coast still stretching away to the south of us.

Of course, nobody does 'cross the ocean that way, but this will give you some idea of where China lies, as compared with the latitude of the United States. When it comes to climate, during a winter in north China you might easily be persuaded that you were in Minnesota or the Dakotas. The people talk about the "dry cold" in the same way, and insist that they never feel the sub-zero weather. But you will have to go almost to Panama to find the sort of summer weather that south China provides.

CHINA'S BOUNDARIES

We are now supposed to have landed on the China shore, and we may well look at

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

it a little more closely. It begins up here in the north where the Yellow sea thrusts inland from the Pacific ocean, and by so doing cuts off that thumb that points at Japan — Korea — and then leaves just a little bit of the shore of Manchuria to touch the gulf of Pechili.¹ Beginning here at this northern gulf the coast curves out and around and down until it has swept, like a great letter S, through twenty degrees of latitude (yes, a degree of latitude roughly equals 69 miles) and so has reached another gulf in the south, where China ends and French Indo-China begins.

So much, then, for China's eastern border, which is her Pacific coast. We go back to the north, where the coast begins, and we find the border of Manchuria bearing away inland, heading almost directly north behind a narrow wall of Siberia, until it has climbed north about 650 miles, when it turns at a sharp right

1. Pechili, pronounced Bay-chee-lee.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

angle and sweeps westward, providing the southern boundary of Siberia for a distance of something like 4,000 miles, when it starts to curve southward—the curve this time bulging out into the heart of central Asia—to skirt Turkestan, then to turn eastward again, providing the northern border for India and Burma, and coming back to meet the coast, as we have seen, along the northern limits of French Indo-China.

There you have the main boundaries of China—this huge country, sprawling from the seacoast three thousand miles and more into the heart of Asia, and stretching from the almost perpetual cold of Siberia to the almost perpetual heat of Canton and Hongkong. There are more square miles in this country than there would be if you were to take an area the size of the United States and add to it the British Isles, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway,

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

Switzerland, Bulgaria, Greece and Latvia!

DISTINGUISHING CHINA PROPER FROM CHINA

But when you have come to see this enormous China, dominating this greatest of continents, you look again and then see that there are really two Chinas. There is this giant, and then there is a much compacter, smaller China—a China that is called by most geographers China proper. You can separate China proper from the rest of this vast expanse by beginning at the north again and swinging around from the coast westward and southward, peeling off the outer circle of provinces or dependencies, much as you might strip away the skin of an orange. Manchuria thus falls away, and Mongolia, and Sinkiang,² and Tibet.³

Our orange that remains — China

2. Sinkiang, pronounced as spelled.

3. Tibet, pronounced as spelled, accent on second syllable.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

proper—hardly looks so impressive. It is not as large, in area, as the United States. It is, in fact, just about as large as that part of the United States lying east of the Mississippi, with Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Nebraska and Texas thrown in for good measure. But the difference between China proper and the China of the vast area is this: China proper, in its eighteen provinces, contains more than 400,000,000 people, while in all the enormous outer provinces combined there are hardly another 30,000,000! In China proper the people live jammed at an average of 260 to the square mile; in the outer provinces the average is only ten to the square mile. In the United States we have a square mile of territory available for every 35 people.

CHINA PROPER

So you can see why China proper is our real field for study. It is where men live that events of importance happen. This

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

China proper is very easily envisaged. If, instead of coming at it from America, you could come at it from the other side of Asia, you would find it something like a huge frying-pan, with the handle—one end of a province inhabited almost entirely by Moslems, Kansu⁴—running up between Mongolia and Sinkiang, and the pan itself making up the rest of the country. A frying-pan seems a very appropriate figure for China these days.

You would find that this compact, important China has the most remarkable northern border of any nation on earth—the great wall, which starts at the sea and travels more than 1,500 miles westward, over mountains and through valleys, until it comes to an end in far Mongolia. On the west you would find Sinkiang, the most important part of which is Chinese Turkestan, and the sky-piercing mountains of Tibet. And on the south, Burma and French Indo-China.

4. Kansu, pronounced Gan-soo.

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

You would find this country cut in two by a river which divides the country into two fairly equal halves, north and south. This river, the Yangtze, men speak of as "China's spinal cord," for it seems to be the one physical characteristic on which the whole life of the nation depends. North of the river you would find — so long as you remained in China proper — a flat land, sandy, dry, producing big men, accustomed to live on millet and wheat products. There, too, you would find famous provinces, such as Shantung, or famous cities, such as Peking.

South of the river you would find the people smaller. Here they are rice-eaters. There are luxurious farming lands, cut up into infinitesimal farms often not much larger than an American dooryard, where intensive cultivation makes the rice fields and terraces a sight that photographers and painters will compass the world to depict. There are hills, too; some of them worthy to be

WHAT AND WHY IN CHINA

ranked as mountains. This southern half also has its famous provinces, such as Fukien, or cities, such as Canton.

FOREIGN FOOTHOLDS

And now for one final look at this country. You are bound to hear much in these days about the foreign holdings in China, for the Chinese object strenuously to most of them. Where are they? Well, they extend all the way from the extreme south to the extreme north. They consist of the colonies and concessions and settlements and coaling stations that the canny powers have picked up along the coast, and of the concessions that have been obtained in cities on the great river. If you will just fix them in your mind-map, peppering that long coast-line and dotting that spinal cord, you will have begun right there to understand why the Chinese are asking for a change in the condition of affairs.

